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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of cross-border patient mobility on health care quality and
welfare when income varies across and within regions. We use a Salop model with a high, mid-
dle and low income region, where, in each region, a policy maker chooses the level of health
care quality that maximises welfare subject to costs being nanced by general taxation. In
equilibrium, regions with higher income o¤er better quality, implying that the high (low) in-
come region imports (exports) patients and the middle-income region both imports and exports
patients. Assuming DRG-pricing, we nd that a reduction in mobility costs has generally het-
erogeneous e¤ects on regional health care quality and welfare, with low and middle income
regions being vulnerable to adverse e¤ects of cross-border health care liberalisation. We also
show that higher income inequality in a region might have negative spillover e¤ects on quality
provision in other regions because of cross-border patient mobility.
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1 Introduction
Cross-border patient mobility is currently a key issue for health policy. In the European Union
(EU), patient mobility across member states has been high on the political agenda for many years,
despite the fact that the free movement principles do not apply to health care provision. A key
example is the new Directive adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2011, which
gives patients the right to choose among health care providers across all member states within the
EU.1 On the 25th of October 2013, when the Directive came into force in the member states, the
Health Commissioner Tonio Borg said:2
"Today is an important day for patients across the European Union. As of today, EU
law in force enshrines citizensright to go to another EU country for treatment and get
reimbursed for it (. . . ). For patients, this Directive means empowerment: greater choice
of healthcare, more information, easier recognition of prescriptions across-borders."
Although patient mobility currently is fairly low across EU countries, enforcement of the new
Directive may have a large impact on the demand for health care across borders. According to
a recent Eurobarometer survey, 49% reported that they would be willing to travel to another EU
country to receive medical treatment.3 This gure indicates a signicant potential for cross-border
patient ows within the EU.
Cross-border patient mobility is also a key policy issue in countries with regional health care
provision. In Sweden, for example, the government implemented a free choice reform in 2003,
which allowed patients to demand health care outside their home region (county) and specied
transfers payments across regions. A similar system is in place in Italy, where many patients migrate
from the south to the north in order to obtain better medical care. However, in Canada, patient
mobility across provinces is generally limited to emergency and sudden illness or allowed only
in special circumstances. In the US, state-specic regulations restrict individuals from purchasing
health insurance outside their home state, which limits patient mobility across state lines. However,
during the debate over Obamacare, the Republicans promoted an alternative approach that involved
1Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the application of
patientsrights in cross-border healthcare.
2The full statement of the Health Commissioner can be found here: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-932_en.htm
3The survey, Special Eurobarometer 425 Patients rights in crossborder healthcare in the Eu-
ropean Union, was conducted by TNS Opinion & Social for the European Commission in 2014;
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm.
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allowing individuals to purchase health insurance across state lines.4
Understanding the e¤ects of liberalising cross-border patient mobility is of great importance
for health policy. However, the existing knowledge on patient mobility across countries or regions
is scarce, and our paper contributes to lling this gap in the literature.5 As illustrated by the
statement from the EU Health Commissioner, a key objective of liberalising cross-border patient
mobility is to enhance patient choice and to improve access to high-quality medical care. This
is perceived to stimulate competition and increase incentives for providers to o¤er better medical
care to patients. In this paper, we show that these conjectures are not necessarily true, and that
liberalisation of cross-border patient mobility can be counterproductive in achieving its goal of
improved access to high-quality care.
We study the e¤ects of liberalisation of cross-border health care on the quality of health care
provision in the di¤erent countries (or regions) depending on whether they attract or export patients
from other countries (or regions). We are also interested in whether stimulating cross-border patient
mobility (by reducing the monetary or non-monetary access costs) improves welfare and is benecial
for the countries, and in case for whom (the exporting or importing countries), in order to provide
some insight and guidance for health policy on this topic. Finally, we explore how intra- or inter-
regional income inequality a¤ects regional health care quality when patients are allowed to seek
health care outside their own region/country.
To study the e¤ects of cross-border patient mobility, we develop a Salop-type model with three
regions that di¤er in the distribution of income, so that we have a high-income, a middle-income,
and a low-income region. In each region, patients prefer to be treated by their local health care
provider, and will only travel to a neighbouring region if the health care quality in this region is
su¢ ciently large relative to the home region. More precisely, cross-border patient mobility occurs
only when the utility gain from receiving better care in the neighbouring region exceeds the utility
loss related to travel and possible copayments. In each region, a policy maker sets the health care
quality in order to maximise the regions welfare subject to a budget constraint where the health
care costs are nanced by taxation and transfer payments related to patient mobility. To allow
for income e¤ects, we assume individuals have decreasing marginal utility of income, which implies
that the marginal cost of raising tax revenues decreases with average income. Consequently, health
4See, for instance, http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/05/11/will-buying-health-insurance-across-
state-lines-reduce-costs/
5See, for instance, the review by Brekke et al. (2014a).
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care quality is increasing in the regionsincome level, implying patient mobility from lower income
to higher income regions.
We focus on the equilibrium where the high-income region attracts patients from both the low-
and middle-income region and the middle-income region attracts patients from the low-income
region. This implies that the high-income (low-income) region only imports (exports) patients and
the middle-income region both imports and exports patients. Assuming DRG-pricing, where the
price per patient is set equal to the marginal treatment cost in each region, the importing (high-
and middle-income) regions are fully compensated for the medical treatment of migrating patients.
However, for the exporting (middle- and low-income) regions, migrating patients imply a nancial
loss if the marginal treatment cost is higher in the importing region. This will be the case under
the reasonable assumption that treatment costs are higher in richer regions.
Based on this framework, we derive a rich set of results regarding the regional e¤ects (on quality
provision and welfare) of liberalising cross-border health care. First, increased patient mobility has
no e¤ect on quality provision or social welfare in the high-income region. The reason is simply that,
for this region, mobility costs do not a¤ect the benet-side since no patients in this region travel to
another region to obtain care or the cost-side since migrating patients are fully compensated by
the DRG-pricing, as explained above. However, for the two other regions, the e¤ects of liberalising
cross-border health care are somewhat mixed and depends partly on whether liberalisation happens
through a reduction in monetary versus non-monetary mobility costs.
A reduction in non-monetary mobility costs (e.g. a simplication of administrative proce-
dures) reduces quality in the middle-income region, and also reduces quality in the low-income
region if indirect e¤ects are su¢ ciently small. In both of these regions, the direct e¤ects of lower
(non-monetary) mobility costs on quality provision are unambiguously negative. Increased patient
mobility reduces the marginal benet of quality provision, because fewer patients will be treated
in their home region. In addition, since patient export has monetary costs both for the patients
who migrate and for the remaining tax payers higher mobility needs to be nanced by a higher
income tax rate for exporting regions, which increases the marginal cost of quality provision. For
the low-income region, we also identify an indirect e¤ect related to quality provision in this region
being a strategic substitute to the quality provision in the middle-income region, which tends to
counteract direct e¤ects mentioned above. In sum, liberalisation of cross-border health care by
reducing red tape costs for patients has adverse e¤ects on health care quality for at least one
4
region.
The e¤ects of reducing monetary costs of patient mobility (i.e., patient copayments) are qualita-
tively similar to the e¤ects of reducing non-monetary costs for the middle- and low-income regions,
as described above. However, there is an additional budget e¤ect that makes the overall e¤ect
generally indeterminate. A lower copayment implies that a larger share of the costs of patient
export need to be nanced by the exporting regionstax payers, which in turn implies a tightening
of the governments budget constraint. This gives the exporting (low- and middle-income) regions
an incentive to increase quality in order to mitigate the increase in mobility caused by lower patient
copayments.
The e¤ects of cross-border health care liberalisation on regional welfare are also mixed, and we
can identify potential winners and losers from such a policy. If liberalisation is done by reducing
non-monetary mobility costs, the middle-income region benets (in terms of higher social welfare)
while the welfare e¤ect in the low-income region is indeterminate. The middle-income region
unambiguously benets because of the cost reduction for those patients who seek treatment in
the high-income region. A similar e¤ect also applies to the low-income region. However, in this
region there is a potentially counteracting welfare e¤ect due to the quality reduction in the middle-
income region, which harms the migrating patients but benets the remaining tax payers in the
low-income region. If, on the other hand, cross-border mobility is stimulated by a reduction in
monetary mobility costs, the welfare e¤ects in the middle- and low-income regions are generally
ambiguous. In sum, adverse regional welfare-e¤ects of cross-border health care liberalisation cannot
be ruled out, but seem less likely if liberalisation is done by reducing non-monetary costs of mobility.
Finally, regarding the e¤ects of income inequality on regional quality provision, we nd that
higher inter-regional income inequality tends to amplify inter-regional di¤erences in health care
quality, although the results are not clear-cut. Quality increases (decreases) in the high-income
(middle-income) region, whereas the e¤ect on quality provision in the low-income region is theoret-
ically ambiguous. The e¤ects of higher intra-regional income inequality, on the other hand, depend
on the region in which income dispersion increases. Higher income inequality in the high-income
region leads to higher quality in that region and lower quality in the other two regions, while higher
income inequality in either the middle-income or the low-income region has no e¤ect on quality pro-
vision in the high-income region and indeterminate e¤ects on the other two regions. Thus, allowing
for cross-border patient mobility can create negative spillover e¤ects of higher income inequality in
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the form of lower quality of health care in neighbouring regions.
In sum, the consequences of cross-border patient mobility are far from straightforward. As
explained above, liberalising or encouraging patient mobility across regions may have adverse e¤ects
on health care quality and welfare, particularly in low- and middle-income regions. Moreover,
increasing the income dispersion across regions, which can be interpreted as extending the EU
towards Eastern Europe, may have positive e¤ects on the high-income regions, but negative e¤ects
for the middle-income and possibly also the low-income regions. Thus, the new Directive from the
EU is not necessarily to the benet of all member states.
The literature on cross-border patient mobility is limited but growing. The recent papers
by Andritsos and Tang (2013, 2014) use a queueing framework to analyse e¤ect of cross-border
patient mobility on waiting times and reimbursement policies.6 Andritsos and Tang (2013) nd
that patient mobility can increase patient welfare due to increased access to care. However, the
e¤ects on waiting times and reimbursement rates are mixed, and the additional costs of mobility
are disproportionately shared between the participating countries. Andritsos and Tang (2014) nd
that patient mobility can be benecial to public health-care systems (NHS), as health-care funders
can reduce their costs without increasing the patientswaiting time. In border regions, where the
cost of crossing the border is low, outsourcingthe high-cost countrys elective care services to the
low-cost country is a viable strategy from which both countries can benet. Despite similarities,
these studies do not consider the e¤ect of patient mobility on health-care quality nor the role of
di¤erences in income distribution across and within regions, which is the key focus of our paper.
The closest paper to ours is Brekke et al. (2014b) who consider a Hotelling model with two
regions that di¤er in health-care technology, where the region with more e¢ cient technology o¤ers
higher health-care quality and attracts patients from the region with less e¢ cient technology. A
key nding is that the e¤ects of patient mobility depend on the transfer payment. If the payment
is below marginal cost, mobility leads to a race-to-the-bottomin quality and lower welfare in both
regions. Thus, patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on quality provision and welfare unless
an appropriate transfer payment scheme is implemented. In the current paper, we take a di¤erent
approach by focusing on di¤erences in the income distribution across regions and the consequences
6There is also a paper by Petretto (2000) that looks at regionalisation of a National Health Service. It provides
conditions for establishing whether devolution for health care expenditure is desirable. Variations in health expen-
diture will depend on its marginal benet and the marginal cost of public funds, including higher or lower transfers
originating from mobility. However, this paper has no explicit spatial dimension and it is not concerned with the
quality of care. It is thus very di¤erent from ours.
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for patient mobility and regional health-care quality and welfare.7 Di¤erences in income across
regions are an important source of mobility and have received much attention in the EU debate.
The model is extended to three (rather than two) regions: therefore the same region can be both
importing and exporting patients, which cannot arise with the two-region set up in Brekke et al.
(2014b). Finally, we use more general cost functions, allow for copayments when patients demand
care outside their region, and allow for heterogeneity in income within countries/regions (with
richer patients more likely to move). Critically, we introduce income e¤ects through decreasing
marginal utility of income, which implies that qualities are in most reasonable scenarios strategic
substitutes, and this is an important driver of some key results. We investigate the e¤ect of policy-
relevant parameters such as patientscopayments and inter- and intra-regional income dispersion.
Thus, our paper is signicantly di¤erent from Brekke et al. (2014b).
Our paper also relates to the broader health economics literature on provider competition and
quality incentives. A key nding from this literature is that with regulated prices, competition
increases health-care quality if providers are prot-maximisers, whereas the relationship between
competition and quality is generally ambiguous if providers are (partly) altruistic.8 Despite some
similarities, our study di¤ers from this literature as we consider competition between regions (rather
than providers), where health-care quality is set by policy makers that maximise regional welfare
nanced through taxation. Moreover, the income distribution across and within regions is central
to our study, but not a part of the previously cited papers.9 Thus, the competitive mechanisms
in our model are clearly di¤erent from the more general literature on provider competition and
quality incentives.10
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present our model. In Section
3 we describe the strategic relationship between regionsoptimal choices of quality provision. In
Section 4 we analyse the e¤ects of liberalising cross-border health care  through a reduction in
either monetary or non-monetary mobility costs  on regional quality provision and welfare. In
7Analytically, di¤erences in quality in the current paper are driven by di¤erences in income. In Brekke et al.
(2014b) countries di¤er in the marginal cost of quality, ie a country has a technology advantage.
8See for example Gravelle (1999), Gravelle and Sivey (2010), Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006), and Brekke,
Siciliani and Straume (2011). See Gaynor (2006) for an excellent review of the literature on competition and quality
in health care markets.
9There is a paper by Aiura and Sanjo (2010) that uses a Hotelling model with two regions that di¤er in their
population density to study incentives for health care quality. While this paper shares some similarities in the demand
structure, the focus is very di¤erent as they study the impact of privatisation of local public hospitals.
10Our paper also relates to the economic literature on scal federalism and interregional competition, in particular
the part of this literature concerned with cross-border shopping. However, this literature is mainly concerned with
taxation rather than health-care quality as an incentive for cross-border mobility. See, for instance, Kanbur and Keen
(1993), Trandel (1994), Wang (1999), and Nielsen (2001).
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Section 5 we explore the e¤ects of (inter-regional or intra-regional) income inequality on regional
quality provision and analyse how these e¤ects depend on cross-border patient mobility. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider a market for health care where patients are uniformly distributed on a circle with circum-
ference equal to 1 and the total patient mass normalised to 1. The market consists of three di¤erent
regions, which can be interpreted either as neighbouring countries or neighbouring regions within
the same country. The three regions, indexed by i = L;M;H, are of equal size, each covering 1/3
of the circle. The index i denotes whether the region has Low, Middle or High average income. The
market is served by three health care providers (hospitals), one in each region, where the provider
in Region i is located at xi. We assume that each provider is located at the center of its region,
implying that the patients belonging to Region i are located on the line segment [xi   16 ; xi + 16 ].
Each patient demands one unit of health care (one treatment) from the most preferred provider.
We assume that health care provision is publicly funded through general income taxation and is
free at the point of consumption (at least for patients who seek treatment in their own region).11
The net utility of a patient located at z and receiving health care from the provider in Region
i, located at xi, is given by
U(z; xi) = v + bqi   t jz   xij+ u
 
Y ik

(1)
if the patient receives treatment in the region to which she resides. v > 0 is the patients gross
utility of being treated, qi  q is the quality o¤ered by the provider in Region i (with b > 0
measuring the marginal utility of quality)12 and t is the marginal disutility of travelling.13 The
utility of income is measured by a strictly concave utility function u (). We assume that patients
11We therefore do not allow for the presence of a private sector alternative. Adding this additional choice would
make the presentation of the model much more complicated without gaining additional insights (see Barros and
Siciliani, 2011 for a detailed review of the literature). Moreover, note that in our model patients may have to pay
a copayment when choosing treatment in a di¤erent region, which has some analogies with modelling public versus
private patients choice.
12The lower bound q represents the lowest possible quality the providers can o¤er without being charged with
malpractice and is, for simplicity, normalised to 0.
13We assume that utility is linear in quality and distance. This is without loss of generality. There is strong
empirical evidence showing that distance is a major predictor of patientschoice of hospital, see, e.g., Tay (2003) and
Beckert et al (2012). We also assume that utility is separable in quality and consumption. Again, this is without loss
of generality.
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are heterogeneous in income yk with k = P;R and with yR > yP , i.e., we allow for high income
(Rich) and low income (Poor) patients. Assuming a proportional income tax rate (or social security
contribution),  i > 0, set by the government of Region i, the net income of a type-k patient in
Region i is given by
Y ik := yk (1   i) : (2)
The proportion of high-income patients, i, is assumed to di¤er across regions, with H > M >
L > 0. For later reference, it is useful to dene the average gross income in Region i as
yi := iyR + (1  i) yP : (3)
We also dene the average utility gain of a marginal reduction in the income tax rate in Region i
(when all patients in the region seek treatment in their own region) as
u i := iuY
 
Y iR

yR + (1  i)uY
 
Y iP

yP : (4)
The net utility of a patient located at z and receiving health care from the provider in a
neighbouring Region j (di¤erent from where the patient resides), located at xj , is given by
U(z; xj) = v + bqj   t jz   xj j+ u
bY ik  F; (5)
where F is a non-monetary mobility cost (disutility) of seeking care in a di¤erent region (because
of di¤erent administrative rules and language barriers, for example). We also assume that there is
a monetary cost (copayment)  of receiving care in a di¤erent region, such that the net income of
a type-k patient in Region i who seeks care in a di¤erent region is given by
bY ik := yk(1   i)  : (6)
Assuming that each patient makes a utility-maximising choice of provider, and assuming that
v is su¢ ciently large to ensure full market coverage in equilibrium, patients of type k who travel
from Region i to Region j for treatment are located on a line segment of length max

0; kij
	
, where
kij :=
1
2t

b (qj   qi) + u
bY ik  u  Y ik  F : (7)
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Notice that
@kij
@yk
=

1   i
2t

uY
bY ik  uY  Y ik > 0 if  > 0. (8)
Thus, as long as seeking treatment in a di¤erent region implies some monetary costs, richer patients
are more prone to make this choice. The total number of patients travelling from Region i to Region
j is then given by max f0;ijg, where
ij := i
R
ij + (1  i)Pij : (9)
Notice here that @ij=@qj =   (@ij=@qi) = b=2t.
Since utility is assumed to be strictly concave in income, the marginal cost of raising tax
revenues decreases with average income, implying that the optimally chosen health care quality
will be higher in richer regions. This creates an incentive for patient migration from poorer to
richer regions and we will assume that this is the direction of patient ows in equilibrium. In this
case, total demand for health care in each region is given by
DL =
1
3
  LH   LM ; (10)
DM =
1
3
  MH +LM ; (11)
DH =
1
3
+ MH +LH : (12)
The provider in Region i is assumed to have the following the cost function:
C(Di; qi) = ciDi +K(qi); (13)
where K is increasing and strictly convex in quality, and where cH  cM  cL.
The policy maker in each region chooses quality to maximise the utility of its own residents
subject to a budget constraint. As previously mentioned, we conjecture that quality is highest in
the high-income region and lowest in the low-income region. In turn, this implies that the high-
income region will attract (import) some patients, and the low-income region will export some
patients. The middle-income region both imports patients from the low-income region and exports
some patients to high-income region. We solve in turn the problem for each region.
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2.1 High-income region
The maximisation problem for the policy maker in the high-income region is14
max
qH
WH := 2
Z 1
6
0
(v + bqH   tx) dx+ H
3
u
 
Y HR

+
1  H
3
u
 
Y HP

; (14)
subject to the budget constraint
H
yH
3
=
cH
3
+K (qH)  (pH   cH) (LH +MH) ; (15)
where pH is the price received by region H per patient treated from other regions. From the budget
constraint we can derive
@H
@qH
=
3
yH

K 0 (qH)  (pH   cH) b
t

;
@H
@qM
=
@H
@qL
=
3 (pH   cH) b
2tyH
: (16)
The rst-order condition for optimal quality is given by
dWH
dqH
=
@WH
@qH
+
@WH
@H
@H
@qH
= 0; (17)
which can be written as
b
3
  uH
yH

K 0 (qH)  (pH   cH) b
t

= 0: (18)
The rst term is the marginal utility of health care quality in Region H: Notice that all patients
in Region H seek treatment in their own region and therefore all benet from an increase in qH .
The second term is the marginal cost of health care quality, which is the higher income tax rate
necessary to nance a marginal quality improvement, times the utility loss of higher taxes. Higher
quality will attract more patients from neighbouring regions. Thus, the amount of tax revenues that
need to be raised in order to nance higher health care quality depends partly on the protability
of treating such patients. If pH > (<) cH , less (more) tax revenues need to be raised when patient
immigration increases.
We can also conrm that a higher share of rich patients (which implies higher average income)
14We assume that the problem is well-behaved, which requires either the cost function to be convex or the marginal
utility of consumption to be decreasing (see Appendix).
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reduces the marginal utility loss of income taxation since
@

uH
yH

@H
=

uY
 
Y HR
  uY  Y HP  yRyP
y2H
< 0; (19)
and therefore reduces the marginal cost of quality provision, implying a higher optimal level of
health care quality.
2.2 Low-income region
The maximisation problem for the policy maker in the low-income region is:
max
qL
WL : = L
266666664
R 1
6
 RLH
0
 
v + bqL + u
 
Y LR
  tx dx
+
R 1
6
 RLM
0
 
v + bqL + u
 
Y LR
  tx dx
+
R RLH
0

v + bqH + u
bY LR   t  16 + x  F dx
+
R RLM
0

v + bqM + u
bY LR   t  16 + x  F dx
377777775
+(1  L)
266666664
R 1
6
 PLH
0
 
v + bqL + u
 
Y LP
  tx dx
+
R 1
6
 PLM
0
 
v + bqL + u
 
Y LP
  tx dx
+
R PLH
0

v + bqH + u
bY LP   t  16 + x  F dx
+
R PLM
0

v + bqM + u
bY LP   t  16 + x  F dx
377777775
; (20)
subject to the budget constraint15
L
yL
3
=
cL
3
+K (qL) + (pH      cL) LH + (pM      cL) LM ; (21)
from which we can derive
@L
@qL
=
3
 
K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2   2cL) b2t

yL (1 +  L)
; (22)
@L
@qH
=
3b (pH      cL)
2tyL (1 +  L)
;
@L
@qM
=
3b (pM      cL)
2tyL (1 +  L)
; (23)
15Here we interpret  as a patient copayment, implying that the tax payers in Region L has to pay pi  for each
patient who travel to Region i for treatment (i = H;M).
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where
 L : =
pH + pM   2   2cL
2tyL
L; (24)
L : = LyR

uY
bY LR   uY  Y LR + (1  L) yP uY bY LP   uY  Y LP  : (25)
Here the necessary increase in the income tax rate to nance higher health care quality depends
partly on the corresponding changes in patient emigration. Higher quality of care in Region L
leads to lower patient emigration. Whether this reinforces or dampens the tax increase necessary to
nance higher quality, depends on whether patient emigration is unprotable (pH+pM 2 > 2cL)
or protable (pH+pM 2 < 2cL). The net per-patient price paid by the low-income region is lower
when patientsco-payment is higher. For a su¢ ciently high co-payment, emigration is protable.
The rst-order condition for optimal quality is given by
dWL
dqL
=
@WL
@qL
+
@WL
@L
@L
@qL
= 0; (26)
which can be written as
dWL
dqL
= b

1
3
  (LH +LM )

 
 
K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2   2cL) b2t

yL (1 +  L)


264 uL + 3L  RLH + RLM yR

uY
bY LR   uY  Y LR 
+3 (1  L)
 
PLH + 
P
LM

yP

uY
bY LP   uY  Y LP 
375 : (27)
The rst term is the marginal utility of higher quality for patients in Region L. These benets
accrue only to the patients who seek treatment in their own region. The second term is the marginal
cost of health care quality, which is the utility loss of higher taxes. The second and third term in
the square brackets are the extra (per patient) utility loss of higher taxes for rich and poor patients,
respectively, who travel out of the region for treatment. If the co-payment is positive ( > 0), the
net income is higher for patients who stay than for patients who go, implying an extra utility loss
of higher taxes (because of decreasing marginal utility of income) for patients who are treated in
other regions.
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2.3 Middle-income region
The maximisation problem for the policy maker in the middle-income region is:
max
qM
WM : = M
264 R
1
6
 RMH
0
 
v + bqM + u
 
YMR
  tx dx
+
R RMH
0

v + bqH + u
bYMR   t  16 + x  F dx
375
+(1  M )
264 R
1
6
 PMH
0
 
v + bqM + u
 
YMP
  tx dx
+
R PMH
0

v + bqH + u
bYMP   t  16 + x  F dx
375 (28)
+
Z 1
6
0
 
v + bqM + Mu
 
YMR

+ (1  M )u
 
YMP
  tx dx;
subject to
M
yM
3
=
cM
3
+K (qM ) + (pH      cM ) MH   (pM   cM ) LM ; (29)
from which we can derive
@M
@qM
=
3
 
K 0 (qM )  (pH    + pM   2cM ) b2t

yM (1 +  M )
; (30)
@M
@qH
=
3b (pH      cM )
2tyM (1 +  M )
;
@M
@qL
=
3b (pM   cM )
2tyM (1 +  M )
; (31)
where
 M : =
(pH      cM )
2tyM
M ; (32)
M : = MyR

uY
bYMR   uY  YMR + (1  M ) yP uY bYMP   uY  YMP  : (33)
Again, notice that the tax increase necessary to nance higher health care quality depends partly
on the costs saved (or incurred) by reduced patient migration to Region H.
The rst-order condition for optimal quality is given by
dWM
dqM
=
@WM
@qM
+
@WM
@M
@M
@qM
= 0; (34)
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which can be written as
dWM
dqM
= b

1
3
  MH

 
 
K 0 (qM )  (pH    + pM   2cM ) b2t

yM (1 +  M )


264 uM + 3MRMHyR
h
uY
bYMR   uY  YMR i
+3 (1  M )PMHyP
h
uY
bYMP   uY  YMP i
375 : (35)
The interpretation is completely equivalent to the interpretation for optimal quality in Region L,
where the di¤erences only account for di¤erences in cross-regional patient ows.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium.
[Figure 1 here]
3 Strategic interaction between regions
In order to understand the main mechanisms involved in the model, it is instructive to study
the nature of the strategic interaction between the di¤erent regions. If the quality in Region j
increases, what is the optimal response by Region i? As we will show below, this depends partly
on the direction of patient ow between these two regions.
Suppose that the patient ow in equilibrium is from Region j to Region i (which implies that
i = H;M , j = M;L, i 6= j). The optimal response of the policy maker in Region i to a quality
increase in Region j is then given by
d2Wi
dqidqj
=
3b
2t
(pi   ci)!i

iuY Y
 
Y iR

y2R + (1  i)uY Y
 
Y iP

y2P

+ ij ; (36)
where
ij =
8><>: 0 if i = HML if i =M ; (37)
and where !i is a positive term related to the marginal cost of quality provision in Region i.16
For the high-income region, the sign of the response to a quality increase in either the low- or
middle-income region depends solely on whether the price received by the high-income region is
16
!i =
8<:
(K0(qM ) (pH +pM 2cM ) b2t )
[yM (1+ M )]
2 if i =M
K0(qH ) (pH cH ) bt
y2
H
if i = H
:
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above or below the marginal cost of treatment. If pH > (<) cH , the quality response is negative
(positive), implying strategic substitutability (complementarity). Intuitively, an increase in quality
in one of the other regions reduces the number of migrating patients and the associated prots (if
price is above marginal cost) for the high-income region. The higher marginal cost of providing
quality implies that the high-income region responds by reducing quality. Qualities are strategically
independent only if the price is equal to the marginal cost of treatment, or if the marginal utility
from consumption is constant.
For the middle-income region, the response to a quality increase in the low-income region
depends on the sum of two terms. First, it depends on whether patient migration from the low-
to the middle-income region is protable or not for the latter region (i.e., whether pM is above or
below cM ). The intuition is of course similar to the one given above for the high-income region.
In addition, the total e¤ect also depends on the term ML, which is a function of the third-order
derivative of the utility function, with limited economic intuition (ML = 0 if uY Y Y = 0).
Consider now the policy response of Region j to a quality increase in Region i (i.e., the optimal
policy response to a quality increase in a patient-importing region). The optimal response is given
by
d2Wj
dqjdqi
=  b

b
2t
  j
2t
@ j
@qi

 !j
2666664
3b
2tj   j
@j
@qi
0B@ jy2R

uY
bY jR  uY Y jR2
+(1  j) y2P

uY
bY jP  uY Y jP2
1CA
 @j@qi

jy
2
RuY Y

Y jR

+ (1  j) y2PuY Y

Y jP
 
3777775+ ji; (38)
where
j =
8><>:
3
t if j = L
3
2t if j =M
; (39)
!j is a positive term related to the marginal cost of quality provision in Region j,17 and ji is a
term that depends on the third-order derivative of the utility function (LH = LM = MH = 0 if
uY Y Y = 0).
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!j =
8<:
(K0(qM ) (pH +pM 2cM ) b2t )
yM (1+ M )
if j =M
(K0(qL) (pH+pM 2 2cL) b2t )
yL(1+ L)
if j = L
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If we abstract from e¤ects that work through the term ji, the optimal response can be decom-
posed into three di¤erent e¤ects: (i) a direct utility e¤ect, (ii) an income e¤ect, and (iii) indirect
e¤ects through the budget constraint. The rst two e¤ects are negative (suggesting strategic substi-
tutability), whereas the third e¤ect is a priori ambiguous and depend on the protability of patient
emigration. Below we will explain each of these three e¤ects in detail.
(i) An increase in quality of a neighbouring (patient-importing) region reduces the number
of patients who seek care in the home region. This reduces the marginal benet of the exporting
region to provide quality. This e¤ect is captured by the rst term in (38).
(ii) If patients who travel to a neighbouring region pay a co-pay ( > 0), their net income is
lower and the marginal utility from income higher, which e¤ectively increases the marginal cost of
providing quality in the exporting region. This e¤ect is captured by the rst term on the second
line of (38).
(iii) If patient mobility is either protable or unprotable for the exporting region, higher quality
in a neighbouring region will a¤ect the budget, and thereby the incentives for quality investments.
This e¤ect is captured by the terms including @ j=@qi in (38). Suppose that mobility is unprotable
for the exporting region, such that @ j=@qi > 0. This has one rst-order and two second-order
e¤ects on the incentives for quality provision. The rst-order e¤ect, given by the last term in the
square brackets of (38), is that the tax increase will increase the marginal cost of quality provision
(because of decreasing marginal utility of income). This e¤ect is dampened by two second-order
e¤ects (given by the two other terms in (38) that include @ j=@qi). Because of copayments ( > 0),
and since uY Y () < 0, a higher tax rate will make it relatively more costly for patients to travel
out of the region, which dampens mobility and therefore increases (reduces) the marginal benet
(cost) of quality provision.
Thus, given that the two second-order e¤ects described above do not outweigh the rst-order
e¤ect, the third e¤ect reinforces (counteracts) the rst two e¤ects if patient migration is unprof-
itable (protable) for the exporting region. In the rest of the paper we assume that the rst two
e¤ects always outweigh the third e¤ect, implying that quality in an exporting region is a strategic
substitute to quality in an importing region.
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4 Liberalisation of cross-border health care
In this section, we analyse how increased cross-border patient mobility is likely to a¤ect quality
provision and social welfare in each of the three regions. We do so by conducting comparative
statics with respect to each of the two mobility cost parameters; the non-monetary cost F and
the monetary cost . A reduction in the patient copayment, , has a straightforward policy
interpretation, while a reduction in F can be interpreted as a policy to reduce the red tapecosts
of seeking treatment in another region.
To keep comparative statics tractable, throughout the remainder of the analysis we assume
that prices are set equal to the marginal treatment costs, i.e., pH = cH , pM = cM . This is in line
with current DRG pricing in several countries where xed costs are not included in the tari¤. We
also make the highly reasonable assumption that the patient copayment  is such that a patient
from Region j seeking treatment in Region i never pays more than the di¤erence between the price
charged by the importing region and the price reimbursed by the exporting region; i.e.,   ci  cj .
Finally, we assume that uY Y Y = 0, without much loss of generality.
In the following, we also use a more compact notation and adopt the following denitions:
uY := uY
bY ik  uY  Y ik > 0 (40)
is the di¤erence in the marginal utility of income for patients who move and pay a copayment and
those who do not;18
u i i := uY Y ()

iy
2
R + (1  i) y2P

< 0 (41)
is the expected degree of concavity (across patients with di¤erent income) of utility with respect
to the tax rate;
ui := iuY
bY iR+ (1  i)uY bY iP > 0 (42)
is the marginal utility of income due to a reduction in copayment; and
eK 0M (qM ) := K 0 (qM )  (pH      cM ) b=2t > 0 (43)
18Under the assumption uY Y Y = 0, notice that uY is the same for all patients, regardless of whether they are
rich or poor, and regardless of which region they move from and to.
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and eK 0L (qL) := K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2   2cL) b=2t > 0 (44)
are the marginal costs of quality in Region M and Region L, respectively, net of nancial transfers
due to patientsmobility.
4.1 Administrative mobility costs
Suppose policymakers reduce the complexity of administrative procedures to obtain health care
in a di¤erent region, in order to encourage mobility. In our model, this policy corresponds to a
reduction in F . Applying Cramers rule, we obtain
dqH
dF
= 0; (45)
dqM
dF
=

 d
2WM
dq2M
 1
d2WM
dqMdF
; (46)
dqL
dF
=

 d
2WL
dq2L
 1
d2WL
dqLdF
+
dqM
dF
d2WL
dqLdqM
; (47)
where
d2WM
dqMdF
=
b
2t

1  M
@M
@F

+
eK 0M (qM )
yM (1 +  M )
"
3M
2t
  uM M
 
3 (uY )
2
uY Y () t   1
!
@M
@F
#
> 0; (48)
d2WL
dqLdF
=
b
t

1  L
@L
@F

+
eK 0L (qL)
yL (1 +  L)
"
3L
t
  uLL
 
3 (uY )
2
uY Y () t   1
!
@L
@F
#
> 0; (49)
and
@M
@F
=  3 (cH      cM )
2tyM (1 +  M )
 0; (50)
@L
@F
=  3 (cH + cM   2   2cL)
2tyL (1 +  L)
 0: (51)
A reduction in the cost of seeking care in a di¤erent region increases mobility ows across
regions. The quality of the high-income region is not a¤ected by changes in mobility given that,
by assumption, the price is set equal to the marginal cost of treatment (pH = cH), and therefore
increased mobility has no implications for the governments budget constraint and the associated
tax rate.
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Health-care quality in middle-income region goes down. We identify three di¤erent e¤ects. The
increase in mobility reduces the number of patients who receive health care in the middle-income
region and the associated marginal benet of quality provision. This e¤ect tends to reduce quality.
It also increases the number of patients who have to pay a copayment, which reduces the marginal
utility of income and tightens the budget constraint. This e¤ect also tends to reduce quality.
Finally, as long as  < cH   cM , migration of patients to the high-income region is costly for the
government of the middle-income region, implying that higher mobility increases the income tax
rate (@M=@F < 0), which also contributes to lower quality provision in Region M .19
For the low-income region we can identify a direct e¤ect of a reduction in F , and an indirect
e¤ect through the strategic responses to quality changes in other regions. The direct e¤ect tends
to reduce quality and has the same intuition as the one provided for the middle-income region.
The main di¤erence is that the low-income region has more patients migrating to other regions,
which tends to amplify the e¤ects. As discussed in Section 3, qualities in the low- and middle-
income regions are strategic substitutes. Since the quality of the middle-income region decreases
in response to higher mobility, the indirect e¤ect goes in the opposite direction of the direct e¤ect.
For a su¢ ciently small indirect e¤ect, quality decreases also in the low-income region.
We summarise the above-described e¤ects as follows:
Proposition 1 A reduction in the non-monetary cost of mobility has (i) no e¤ect on quality in
the high-income region, (ii) reduces quality in the middle-income region, and (iii) reduces quality
also in the low-income region, if indirect e¤ects are su¢ ciently small.
4.2 Patient copayments
As an alternative to reducing non-monetary costs of mobility, suppose that policymakers stimulate
cross-border patient mobility by reducing patient copayments (or other monetary costs of mobility).
19There are some second-order e¤ects that dampen the increase in mobility: since higher mobility implies a
tightening of the budget constraint, the higher tax rate implies that patients can now less easily a¤ord the co-payment
to receive care in a di¤erent region.
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The e¤ects of a change in  on qualities are given by20
dqH
d
= 0; (52)
dqM
d
=

 d
2WM
dq2M
 1
d2WM
dqMd
; (53)
dqL
d
=

 d
2WL
dq2L
 1
d2WL
dqLd
+
dqM
d
d2WL
dqLdqM

: (54)
where
d2WM
dqMd
=
b
2t

uM   M
@M
@

+
eK 0M (qM )
yM (1 +  M )
"
3M
2t
  uM M
 
3 (uY )
2
2tuY Y ()   1
!
@M
@
#
 

uM + 3uY
 
M
R
MHyR + (1  M )PMHyP

yM (1 +  M )
 
b
2t
  3uY Y ()
eK 0M (qM )
1 +  M
!
;(55)
d2WL
dqLd
=
b
t

uL   L
@L
@

+
eK 0L (qL)
yL (1 +  L)
"
3L
t
  uLL
 
3 (uY )
2
tuY Y ()   1
!
@L
@
#
 
264uL + 3uY
0B@ L  RLH + RLM yR
+(1  L)
 
PLH + 
P
LM

yP
1CA
375
yL (1 +  L)
 
b
2t
  3uY Y ()
eK 0L (qL)
1 +  L
!
;(56)
and
@M
@
=  2tMH + 3 (cH      cM )uM
2tyM (1 +  M )
< 0; (57)
@L
@
=  2t (LH +LM ) + 3 (cH + cM   2   2cL)uL
2tyL (1 +  L)
< 0: (58)
Analogously to a reduction in non-monetary costs F , an reduction in copayments, , also lowers
the cost of seeking care in a di¤erent region and therefore increases mobility ows across regions.
However, di¤erently from a change in non-monetary costs, a reduction in copayments also tightens
the budget constraint of the middle- and low-income regions: a smaller copayment increases the
tax rate necessary to nance mobility.
As before, the quality of the high-income region is not a¤ected by changes in mobility given
20The results in this section would be qualitatively similar if we instead assume a cost-sharing system where a
patient from Region j seeking treatment in Region i pays ji =  (pi   pj) =  (ci   cj), where  2 (0; 1). In such
a system, the special case  = 1 (which corresponds to  = ci   cj in the current model set-up) would imply that
cross-border patient mobility is budget neutral (i.e., @ i=@F = 0).
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that, by assumption, the price is set equal to the marginal cost of treatment (pH = cH), and
therefore mobility has no implications for the governments budget constraint and the associated
tax rate. Moreover, since no patients from the high-income region moves to a di¤erent region, there
are no copayments paid.
The e¤ect of a lower copayment in the middle-income region is qualitatively similar to a re-
duction in non-monetary costs F , and therefore tends to reduce quality. However, it contains one
additional e¤ect, given by the last term in (55). Since a lower copayment makes mobility more
expensive for the government in the middle-income region, this region has stronger incentives to
raise quality in order to limit migration to other regions: less expenses are now paid directly by
the patient and mobility has a stronger negative e¤ect on the governments nances. This e¤ect
could potentially reverse the e¤ect on the quality provision in the middle-income region: quality
may increase rather than decrease.
A similar direct e¤ect of a copayment reduction, given by the last term in (56), can be identied
for the low-income region. However, the overall e¤ect on quality in the low-income region also
depends on an indirect e¤ect, namely the strategic response to quality changes in the middle-income
region. Suppose that the sum of the direct e¤ects are such that a copayment reduction tends reduce
(increase) quality in the low- and middle-income region. Because of strategic substitutability, the
reduction (increase) in quality in the low-income region is attenuated by the strategic response to
the reduction (increase) of quality in the middle-income region, which  in isolation  tends to
increase (reduce) quality in the low-income region.
The e¤ects of lower monetary mobility costs on regional quality provision are summarised as
follows:
Proposition 2 A reduction in patient copayments has no e¤ect on quality in the high-income
region, and has an indeterminate e¤ect on the quality of the low- and middle-income regions.
4.3 Patient mobility and regional welfare
How does an increase in patient mobility because of lower monetary or non-monetary mobility
costs a¤ect social welfare in each of the three regions? Before proceeding to answer this question,
it is instructive to consider some general characteristics of the welfare comparative statics. The
welfare in each region is given by Wi(qH(x); q

M (x); q

L(x); x), where x is the parameter of interest.
Notice rst that, due to the envelope theorem, @W i =@q

i = 0. Moreover, because of the assumption
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pi = ci, indirect welfare e¤ects in a particular region only come from quality changes in neighbouring
regions to which the region in question is exporting patients. Assuming that the patient ow is
from Region j to Region i, indirect welfare e¤ects are given by
@W j
@qi
= bji +
uj
3
@ j
@qi
(59)
and are generally ambiguous. On the one hand, higher quality in Region i increases the utility of
the patients who travel from Region j (rst term in (59)). On the other hand, higher quality in
Region i increases patient export to this region, which if  < ci cj implies a higher tax burden
for the residents of Region j (second term in (59)).
4.3.1 Administrative mobility costs
Consider a reduction in F . For the high-income region the e¤ect is zero: there are no patients
moving from the high-income region to other regions, and mobility is budget neutral.
The e¤ect of lower non-monetary mobility costs on welfare in the low-income region is
dW L
dF
=
@W L
@F
+
@W L
@qM
@qM
@F
; (60)
where
@W L
@F
=   (LH +LM ) : (61)
A reduction in F has three di¤erent e¤ects one positive and two negative on welfare in the
low-income region: (i) it directly reduces the cost for all patients who move, which has a positive
welfare e¤ect, (ii) it increases the marginal tax rate (if mobility is unprotable), which has a
negative welfare e¤ect, and (iii) it reduces quality in Region M , which all else equal reduces
utility for those patients who move from Region L to Region M and therefore also has a negative
welfare e¤ect.
Finally, the e¤ect of lower non-monetary mobility costs in the middle-income region is simply
given by
dW M
dF
=
@W M
@F
=  MH < 0: (62)
Thus, lower costs of mobility has an unambiguously positive e¤ect on welfare in RegionM , because
of the cost reduction for those patients who travel to Region H for treatment.
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Proposition 3 A reduction in the non-monetary cost of mobility has (i) no e¤ect on welfare in
the high-income region, (ii) a positive welfare e¤ect in the middle-income region, and (iii) an
indeterminate e¤ect on welfare in the low-income region.
These welfare results suggest that there might be both winners and losers from a policy of
facilitating cross-border patient mobility by reducing administrative costs, and that the potential
losers are patients and tax payers in the low-income region.
4.3.2 Patient copayments
As for the case of non-monetary mobility costs, a reduction in the monetary cost  has no e¤ect
on welfare in the high-income region: there are no patients moving from the high-income region to
other regions, and mobility is budget neutral.
However, in contrast to the e¤ect of non-monetary mobility costs, the direct e¤ects of a copay-
ment reduction on welfare in the low-income and middle-income regions are ambiguous, and given
by
@W L
@
=   (LH +LM )uL  
uL
3
@L
@
(63)
and
@W M
@
=  MHuM  
uM
3
@M
@
: (64)
On the one hand, and similarly to a reduction in non-monetary mobility costs, a larger copayment
increases utility for those who move to a di¤erent region to obtain health care. On the other hand,
it increases the tax rate necessary to nance patient exports.
In the middle-income region, the welfare e¤ect is given only by the direct e¤ect in (64), whereas
the overall welfare e¤ect in the low-income region is
dW L
d
=
@W L
@
+
@W L
@qM
@qM
@
; (65)
where the indirect e¤ect (because of strategic substitutability) depends on the sign of @W M=@.
Proposition 4 A reduction in patient copayments has no e¤ect on welfare in the high-income
region, and has indeterminate e¤ects on welfare in the middle- and low-income regions.
Propositions 3 and 4 suggest that a policy of stimulating cross-border patient mobility might
have adverse welfare e¤ects at regional level. When seen in conjunction, these two propositions
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also suggest that such adverse e¤ects might be less likely if the policy implies a reduction in non-
monetary, rather than monetary, mobility costs.
5 Income inequality
In this section we exploit the structural richness of our model to analyse how regional quality
provision depends on the degree of income inequality  both across and within regions when
patients have the option to seek treatment outside their own region.
5.1 Inter-regional income inequality
In order to study the e¤ects of inter-regional income inequality on regional quality provision, we
assume that H = M +  and L = M   , where  measures the degree of income dispersion
across regions. An increase in  has no e¤ect on the income distribution in the middle-income
region, increases the proportion of rich individuals in the high-income region and reduces it in the
low-income region.
How does an increase in inter-regional income dispersion a¤ect quality provision? The e¤ects
are given by
dqH
d
=

 d
2WH
dq2H
 1
d2WH
dqHd
; (66)
dqM
d
=

 d
2WM
dq2M
 1
dqH
d
d2WM
dqMdqH
; (67)
dqL
d
=

 d
2WL
dq2L
 1 
d2WL
dqLd
+
dqM
d
d2WL
dqLdqM
+
dqH
d
d2WL
dqLdqH

; (68)
where
d2WH
dqHd
= K 0 (qH)
 
uY
 
Y HP
  uY  Y HR  yRyPy2H   uHH H (yR   yP )y2H > 0; (69)
d2WL
dqLd
= b
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t
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
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 
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
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and
@L
@
=
L (yR   yP ) 
 
(cH      cL)
 
RLH   PLH

+ (cM      cL)
 
RLM   PLM

yL
; (71)
and where 	 is a complex term that tends to zero when the copayment tends to zero (the full
expression is available in the Appendix).
As expected, increased inter-regional income inequality leads to higher quality provision in the
high-income region. The intuition is relatively simple and consists of two e¤ects. A higher income
implies that, for a given tax rate, the average expected marginal utility of income is lower, and the
tax rate necessary to nance health care is also lower. Both e¤ects reduce the marginal cost of
quality provision. There are no indirect e¤ects since the quality choice of the high-income region
is independent of qualities in other regions.
Since the middle-income region maintains the same average income, there are no direct e¤ects
on quality. However, since qualities are strategic substitutes, the increase in quality by the high-
income region triggers a reduction in quality for the middle-income region.
The e¤ects in the low-income region are considerably more involved. We can distinguish several
direct and indirect e¤ects. First, an increase in dispersion reduces the average income in the low-
income region, which tends to reduce quality due to the higher tax rate and the higher marginal
utility of income. Second, since poor patients are less willing than rich patients to seek treatment
outside their region, an increase in the share of poor patients reduces overall mobility, which
increases incentives to provide quality for two reasons: (i) more patients benet from the quality
investment and (ii) lower mobility reduces the tax rate and therefore the marginal cost of quality
provision. Finally, since qualities are strategic substitutes across regions, there are two indirect
e¤ects going in opposite direction: the increase (reduction) in quality in the high- (middle-) income
region triggers lower (higher) incentives for quality provision in the low-income region.
Proposition 5 An increase in inter-regional income inequality leads to (i) higher quality in the
high-income region, (ii) lower quality in the middle-income region, and (iii) has an ambiguous e¤ect
on quality in the low-income region.
An increase in income dispersion always increases the quality di¤erence between the high- and
middle-income regions. If the income e¤ect dominates, and quality also reduces in the low-income
region, the quality di¤erence between the high- and low-income regions will also increase. However,
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the quality di¤erence between the middle- and the low-income regions could reduce if the quality
in the low-income region remains unchanged or changes to a smaller extent.
5.2 Intra-regional income inequality
Let us nally consider how increased income inequality in a particular region a¤ects quality provi-
sion in the same and (potentially) other regions. We model income dispersion within Region i as
a mean-preserving spread  such that eyiR := yR + i and eyiP := yP   1 i . This denition implies
collecting 1 i euros from each of the poor and distributing this amount by giving

i
to each of
the rich. Income inequality is increased without a¤ecting average income.
The e¤ect of higher income dispersion in the high-income region on the same regions optimal
quality provision is given by
dqH
d
=   d
2WH
dqHd
=
d2WH
dq2H
: (72)
with
dWH
dqHd
=   uY  Y HR   uY  Y HP + uY Y ()  Y HR   Y HP  K 0 (qH)yH > 0: (73)
Thus, higher income dispersion will increase the optimal quality level. The intuition is quite
straightforward. As long as average income remains constant, higher income dispersion implies
that the rich bear a larger share of the total tax burden. A tax reduction will therefore benet the
rich to a higher degree, which implies that the average utility gain of a marginal tax reduction is
lower. This, in turn, implies that the optimal tax rate, and therefore the optimal quality provision,
is higher. Given strategic substitutability between regions, a higher income dispersion in the high-
income region will then ultimately lead to lower quality in the other two regions.
The e¤ect of higher income dispersion in the middle-income region on that regions quality
provision is given by
dqM
d
=   d
2WM
dqMd
=
d2WM
dq2M
; (74)
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where21
d2WM
dqMd
=
@2WM
@M@
@M
@qM
=
264 uY  YMP   uY  YMR   uY Y ()  YMR   YMP 
 3uY
 
1
2t
 
uY
 
YMR   YMP

+ RMH   PMH

375 @M
@qM
: (75)
The sign of this expression is a priori ambiguous and depends on the sign of the expression in the
square brackets. The rst line in this expression is positive and reects the fact that, with higher
income dispersion, a marginal tax reduction will to a larger extent benet the rich, which implies
that the average utility gain of a lower tax rate is smaller. This is the same e¤ect as the one
described above, for the high-income region, and contributes, all else equal, to a higher optimal
quality provision.
The second line of the expression is negative and therefore pulls in the opposite direction.
Although higher income dispersion does not a¤ect total patient export (for given quality levels),
it a¤ects the composition of the patients who choose to travel out of the region, with an increase
in the share of rich patients. Thus, higher income dispersion implies that a larger share of rich
patients have to pay a copayment  for health care abroad, which, all else equal, increases the
marginal utility of income for the rich (on average) and therefore counteracts the e¤ect of higher
income dispersion.
Finally, the own-region e¤ects of higher income dispersion in the low-income region are equiva-
lent to the ones of the middle-income region described above and therefore not explicitly presented.
The only qualitative di¤erence is that, while a quality change (positive or negative) in the middle-
income region induced by higher income dispersion indirectly a¤ects quality in the low-income
region (due to strategic substitutability), a similar change in quality provision in the low-income
region has no spillover e¤ects to other regions (under the assumptions pi = ci and uY Y Y = 0).
We summarise the above-described e¤ects as follows:
Proposition 6 (i) Higher income inequality in Region H leads to higher quality in the high-income
region and lower quality in the middle- and low-income regions. (ii) Higher income inequality in
either Region M or Region L has no e¤ect on quality provision in the high-income region and
indeterminate e¤ects on quality in the low- and middle-income regions.
21Notice that uY and MH do not depend on  (i.e., higher income inequality increases the number of rich
patients and reduces the number of poor patients who travel out of the region to be treated, but the net e¤ect is
zero), implying that @
2WM
@qM@
= @M
@
= @
2M
@qM@
= 0.
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6 Conclusions
Cross-border patient mobility is an important issue across countries as exemplied by the new
regulation in the EU and across regions within countries with regional health-care provision, such
as Canada, Italy and Sweden. In this paper we study the consequences of cross-border patient
mobility on the quality of health care and the corresponding regional welfare e¤ects. We develop a
Salop model with three regions; a high-income, a middle-income, and a low-income region. In each
region, health-care quality is set by a policy maker maximising regional welfare subject to health-
care costs being nanced by taxation. Since the marginal cost of taxation is decreasing in income
(due to decreasing marginal utility of income), health-care quality is increasing in the regions
income level. Thus, patient mobility occurs from lower-income regions with poorer health-care
quality to higher-income regions with better health-care quality.
We focus on the (interior) equilibrium where (i) the high-income region attracts patients from
both the low- and middle-income regions and (ii) the middle-income region attracts patients from
the low-income region. Protability of cross-border patient mobility depends on the transfer pay-
ment scheme and we assume DRG-pricing, where the importing region receives a price equal to
marginal treatment cost for migrating patients.
While our analysis produces a rich set of results regarding regional e¤ects of cross-border patient
mobility on quality provision and welfare, we would like to highlight here three di¤erent results:
First, an increase in patient mobility driven by a reduction in non-monetary mobility costs has
no e¤ect on quality in the high-income region, but reduces quality in the middle-income and, if
indirect e¤ects are small, also reduces quality in the low-income region. Thus, and perhaps counter-
intuitively, patient mobility can have adverse e¤ects on the quality of care in lower-income regions
exporting patients to higher-income regions, and can therefore increase dispersion in health care
quality between high- and low-income regions. This result may explain the delay in the application
of the EU Directive in several member countries.22
Second, lower patient copayment for cross-border health care has no e¤ect on quality in the
high-income region, and has an indeterminate e¤ect on the quality in the low- and middle-income
regions. This result shows that whether increased cross-border patient mobility amplies or damp-
ens dispersion in health care quality across di¤erent countries might crucially depend on the exact
mechanism that stimulates mobility.
22Evaluative study on the crossborder Healthcare Directive (2011/24/EU) Final report 21 March 2015.
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Third, an increase in inter-regional income dispersion increases quality in the high-income re-
gion, reduces quality in the middle-income region, whereas the e¤ect on quality provision in the
low-income region is indeterminate. This result might assist in predicting the likely e¤ects of aus-
terity and the economic crisis, which has a¤ected EU Member States in a di¤erential way, and has
been highlighted in the recent change of wind in the decisions by the European Court of Justice
that has ruled against patients asking reimbursement for treatment abroad (Elchinov, Luca and
Petru)23, where patients were coming from countries with relatively lower income (i.e. Romania
and Bulgaria). The concern was that, as a result of mobility, quality may decrease for those patients
who do not seek care abroad.
In summary, the consequences and implications of cross-border patient mobility are far from
straightforward. By way of concluding, we would like to highlight some limitations of our study. Our
results are derived assuming DRG-pricing. While this is a widely used pricing scheme for hospital
care in place in most Western countries, di¤erent regions may bilaterally agree on a di¤erent way
of pricing cross-border care. However, there is still an underlying problem that a patient that is
protable to treat for the importing region might be unprotable for the exporting region to send.
Clearly, designing an optimal payment scheme for cross-border patients is a key challenge. We
leave this issue for future research.
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Appendix A: Second-order derivatives
High-income region
The partial derivatives of the FOC of qH with respect to qH , qM and qL are
d2WH
dq2H
=  uH
yH
K 00 (qH) +
3
 
K 0 (qH)  (pH   cH) bt
2
y2H
0B@ HuY Y  Y HR  y2R
+(1  H)uY Y
 
Y HP

y2P
1CA < 0; (A1)
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dqH@qi
=
3b (pH   cH)
 
K 0 (qH)  bt (pH   cH)
0B@ HuY Y  Y HR  y2R
+(1  H)uY Y
 
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
y2P
1CA
2ty2H
< 0; (A2)
i = L;M:
Middle-income region
The partial derivatives of the FOC of qM with respect to qH , qM and qL are
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dqM@qH
=  b
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b
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t
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M
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
 
 
K 0 (qM )  (pH    + pM   2cM ) b2t

yM (1 +  M )


8>>>>><>>>>>:
2643b2tM   32t @M@qH
0B@ My2R

uY
bYMR   uY  YMR 2
+(1  M ) y2P

uY
bYMP   uY  YMP 2
1CA
375
 @M@qH

My
2
RuY Y
 
Y LR

+ (1  M ) y2PuY Y
 
Y LP
 
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
 3b (pH      cM )
2  K 0 (qM )  (pH    + pM   2cM ) b2t
(2t)2 y3M (1 +  M )
3  (A3)

8><>: uM + 3M
R
MHyR
h
uY
bYMR   uY  YMR i
+3 (1  M )PMHyP
h
uY
bYMP   uY  YMP i
9>=>;

8><>: My
2
R
h
uY Y
bYMR   uY Y  YMR i
+(1  M ) y2P
h
uY Y
bYMP   uY Y  YMP i
9>=>;
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Low-income region
The partial derivatives of the FOC of qL with respect to qH , qM and qL are:
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Appendix B: Comparative statics
Assume that pH = cH ; pM = cM , and uY Y Y = 0, which implies
d2WH
dqHdqM
= d
2WH
dqHdqL
= d
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= 0.
Totally di¤erentiating the FOCs with respect to qualities and a parameter x, we obtain
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
uY
bY LR   uY  Y LR 2
+(1  L) y2P

uY
bY LP   uY  Y LP 2
1CA
  @L@qM uY Y ()

Ly
2
R + (1  L) y2P

9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(B4)
The determinant of the above matrix is
 =
d2WH
dq2H
d2WM
dq2M
d2WL
dq2L
< 0 (B5)
High-income region
The e¤ect of x on qH is given by
dqH
dx
=  
d2WM
dq2M
d2WL
dq2L
d2WH
dqHdx

=

 d
2WH
dq2H
 1
d2WH
dqHdx
(B6)
Since quality in the high-income region is independent of other qualities, there is only one direct
e¤ect and no indirect e¤ects.
Middle-income region
The e¤ect of x on qM is given by
dqM
dx
=   1


d2WM
dqMdx
d2WH
dq2H
d2WL
dq2L
  d
2WH
dqHdx
d2WL
dq2L
d2WM
dqMdqH

=

 d
2WM
dq2M
 1 
d2WM
dqMdx
+
dqH
dx
d2WM
dqMdqH

(B7)
The rst term is the direct e¤ect of x on qM , while the second term the indirect e¤ect through a
quality change in the high-income region.
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Low-income region
The e¤ect of x on qL is given by:
dqL
dx
=   1

264 d2WLdqLdx

d2WH
dq2H
d2WM
dq2M

  d2WMdqMdx
d2WH
dq2H
d2WL
dqLdqM
  d2WHdqHdx

d2WM
dq2M
d2WL
dqLdqH
  d2WMdqMdqH
d2WL
dqLdqM

375
=

 d
2WL
dq2L
 1 
d2WL
dqLdx
+
dqM
dx
d2WL
dqLdqM
+
dqH
dx
d2WL
dqLdqH

(B8)
The full expression for d
2WL
dqLd
in section 5.1 is given by
d2WL
dqLd
= b
 
PLH   RLH + PMH   RMH
  b
t
L
@L
@
+
 
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
(1 +  L)
yP yR
y2L
0BBBB@
uY
 
Y HR
  uY  Y HP 
+
 
RLH + 
R
LM
 
uY
bY LR   uY  Y LR 
   PLH + PLM uY bY LP   uY  Y LP 
1CCCCA
+
 
K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2cL) b2t

(1 +  L) yL
@L
@
266664
0B@ 3tLy2R
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uY
bY LR   uY  Y LR 2
+3t (1  L) y2P

uY
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1CA
 uY Y ()

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2
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
377775
+
 
K 0 (qL)  (pH + pM   2   2cL) b2t

(1 +  L)
2 y2L
 (B9)
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